Measuring polarization, inequality, welfare and poverty by Juan Gabriel Rodríguez
E2004/75
"Measuring polarization, inequality, 
welfare and poverty"
Juan Gabriel RodríguezcentrA:  
Fundación Centro de Estudios Andaluces 
 
Documento de Trabajo 
Serie Economía E2004/75 
 
" Measuring polarization, inequality, welfare and poverty" 
    Juan  Gabriel  Rodríguez 




Este artículo analiza la relación que existe entre las medidas de polarización y desigualdad, bienestar y 
pobreza. En primer lugar, se generaliza el índice de polarización de Wolfson, en términos de los 
componentes intergrupos e intragrupos del índice de Gini, a grupos de renta separados por cualquier valor 
z. En segundo lugar, se demuestra que la medida propuesta de polarización es la diferencia entre el 
bienestar de los ricos y el bienestar de los pobres cuando los sentimientos de identificación se basan en 
sus funciones de utilidad. En tercer lugar, el índice Generalizado de Wolfson es una función del índice de 
pobreza de Sen, de su extensión debida a Shorrocks (1995) y del índice de déficit de pobreza normalizado 
cuando el valor z adoptado coincide con la línea de pobreza. Además, estos resultados son puestos en 
relación con los índices de polarización de Esteban y Ray (1994) y Esteban et al. (1999). 
 




This paper analyzes the relationship between polarization and inequality, welfare and poverty measures. 
First, the Wolfson polarization measure is generalized in terms of the between-groups and within-groups 
Gini components for income groups separated by any z income value. Second, it is shown that 
polarization is the difference between the welfare levels of rich and poor income groups when feelings of 
identification between individuals are based on their utility functions. Third, the proposed polarization 
measure is a function of the Sen poverty index, its extension due to Shorrocks (1995) and the normalized 
poverty deficit index when the z income value represents the poverty line. In addition, these results are 
linked to the Esteban and Ray (1994) and Esteban et al. (1999) polarization measures. 
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Polarization measures have recently been proposed as useful characterizations of 
income distributions.
1 Polarization is widely accepted as being distinct from inequality. 
Polarization concentrates the income distribution on several focal or polar modes, 
whereas inequality relates to the overall dispersion of the distribution. A more polarized 
income distribution is one that is more spread out from the middle, so there are fewer 
individuals or families with mid-level incomes (Wolfson, 1994). Therefore, polarization 
measures can be used to complement the analysis of an income distribution. To make 
income distribution comparisons, it is useful to study not only inequality, poverty and 
welfare, but also polarization. 
Relationships between inequality, poverty and welfare measures have been the focus 
of a large body of research on distribution (see, for instance, Lambert, 2001 and the 
references therein). However, relationships between these concepts and income 
polarization have hardly been analyzed. The similarities and differences between 
welfare, inequality and poverty measures are well known, but we know little about the 
meaning of income polarization in terms of welfare, poverty and inequality. This is the 
main disadvantage of using polarization measures as complementary tools analyzing 
income distribution. 
In this paper, the measurement of polarization is linked to the other primary features 
of an income distribution: inequality, welfare and poverty.  
First, a general relationship between the Wolfson polarization index and the Gini-
based inequality measurement is formally established. The Wolfson polarization 
measure in terms of the between-groups and within-groups Gini components for income 
groups separated by any z income value is obtained. Then, polarization measures for the 
median and mean income values found in the literature (see Rodríguez and Salas, 2003 
and Prieto et al., 2004a) are represented as special cases. Polarization (for any z income 
value) and inequality are viewed within the same framework, with subtraction and 
addition of the within-groups dispersion corresponding to polarization and inequality, 
respectively. In addition, it is shown that the Generalized Wolfson polarization measure 
                                                 
1 See, among others, Foster and Wolfson (1992), Esteban and Ray (1994 and 1999), Wolfson (1994 and 
1997), Esteban et al. (1999), Tsui and Wang (2000), Gradín (2000), Zhang and Kanbur (2001), 
D’Ambrosio and Wolff (2001), Chakravarty and Majumder (2001), Rodríguez and Salas (2003), Prieto et 
al. (2004a and 2004b) and Duclos et al. (2004). 
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is a function of the Esteban and Ray (1994) and Esteban et al. (1999) polarization 
measures. The proposed polarization measure is a function of the Esteban and Ray 
(1994) polarization index when only two groups are considered. The Generalized 
Wolfson polarization measure is also a function of the Esteban et al. (1999) polarization 
index when two income groups are considered and the measurement error weight β is 
equal to unity. Therefore, the relationships between the Generalized Wolfson 
bipolarization index and the welfare and poverty indexes (developed below) can be 
linked to the Esteban and Ray (1994) and Esteban et al. (1999) polarization measures. 
Second, a relationship between polarization and welfare measures arises when envy 
between people is considered in the utility function. It is shown that polarization is the 
difference between the richer income group’s welfare and the poorer income group’s 
welfare when individuals’ utilities depend not only on their own income but also on 
their group incomes. Consequently, polarization increases when the welfare of the 
richer income group rises or the welfare of the poorer income group falls. In addition, 
the feelings of identification between individuals are based on their utility functions in 
the framework used for analysis. This seems closer to the original motivation of the 
identification–alienation framework (see Esteban and Ray, 1994 and Duclos et al., 
2004) than just relying the identification term on the density function value. 
Third, polarization and poverty measures are closely related when the z income value 
used to separate income groups represents the poverty line. In that case, polarization 
between the poor and those elsewhere in the income distribution explicitly considers the 
value of a poverty index. In particular, the Generalized Wolfson polarization measure 
can be expressed as a function of Sen’s poverty index (Sen, 1976), its extension due to 
Shorrocks (1995) and one of the Foster–Greer–Thorbecke family of poverty measures, 
the so-called normalized poverty deficit (Foster et al., 1984). Moreover, the proposed 
polarization measure is a function of wealth, measured by the Normalized wealth 
surplus index. However, it is shown that the Generalized Wolfson polarization measure 
is not an increasing function of these four measures. Only if poverty increases due to the 
income gap ratio and/or wealth increases due to the income overabundance gap ratio 
greater polarization is assured. This is a relevant point as a greater proportion of poor 
people in society does not imply necessarily more social conflict measured by a 
polarization index. 
The paper is organized as follows. The Generalized Wolfson polarization index for 
any z income value is obtained in section 2. In section 3, the relationship between 
centrA:
Fundación Centro de Estudios Andaluces
A:  2
polarization and welfare is analyzed. Poverty and polarization measures are linked in 
section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2  Polarization and inequality: the Generalized Wolfson polarization 
index 
Let F ∈ ℜ
n be an income distribution of n individuals, families or households, with a 
mean income value µ and a median income value m. 
Wolfson’s index of bipolarization (see Wolfson, 1994) was originally proposed for a 
population divided into two groups by the median value: 
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where P1 is the lightly shaded area in Figure 1, G(F) is the Gini coefficient of the 
income distribution, F, and Tm is the trapezoid area delimitated by the diagonal line and 
the tangent to the Lorenz curve (L) at the 50
th population percentile. This trapezoid area 
is equal to the vertical distance between the 45-degree line and the Lorenz curve at the 
median percentile, L(0.5). The larger the shaded area P1, the fewer individuals or 
households there are with mid-level incomes, and hence, the greater is polarization. 
If we divide the population into two groups based on the mean income value (instead 
of the median), the average difference in income pairs within both groups—that is, the 
dispersion within each group, measured by the Gini coefficient—is minimized (see 
Aghevli and Merhan, 1981 and Davies and Shorrocks, 1989). In this case, expression 
(1) can be rewritten as: 
[ ] ) ( )) ( ( 2 2 ) ( F G q L q F P
W − − = µ µ µ    (2) 
where qµ is the population percentile at the mean income value and L(qµ) is the value of 
the Lorenz curve evaluated at qµ. Note that the trapezoid area is easy to determine when 
the income groups are separated by the median or mean incomes. However, difficulties 






















    Figure 1. The Wolfson bipolarization Measure 
 
The Wolfson index of polarization has been reformulated in terms of Gini 
components. The additive decomposition of the Gini coefficient by groups of the 
population (see, for instance, Bhattacharya and Mahalanobis, 1967, Pyatt, 1976 or 
Lambert and Aronson, 1993), when incomes groups do not overlap, is: 


















B(F) is the between-groups Gini coefficient, G
W(F) is the within-groups Gini 
coefficient, LB is the between-groups Lorenz curve, tk is the proportion of the population 
in group k, rk is group k’s share of total income and Gk is the Gini coefficient of group k. 
The Wolfson index of polarization has been reformulated in terms of the between-
groups Gini coefficient and the within-groups Gini coefficient as follows (see 
Rodríguez and Salas, 2003 and Prieto et al., 2004a): 
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[ ] ) ( ) ( 2 ) ( F G F G F P
W B W
µ µ µ − =  (5) 
where the income groups are separated by the median and the mean income values, 
respectively. Therefore, polarization and inequality are explicitly represented within the 
same framework, with subtraction and addition of the within-groups dispersion 
corresponding to polarization and inequality, respectively. In other words, progressive 
income transfers between groups reduce inequality and polarization, while progressive 
income transfers within groups reduce inequality but increase polarization. 
Another advantage of these reformulations is that a link is established between the 
Wolfson concept of polarization and the polarization model of Esteban and Ray (1994) 
and Duclos et al. (2004). The polarization measures in Esteban and Ray (1994) and 
Duclos et al. (2004) rely almost exclusively on the identification–alienation framework. 
Alienation relates to the accentuation of polarization by intergroup heterogeneity, while 
identification relates to the accentuation of polarization by intragroup homogeneity. 
Hence, in our framework, G
B(F) represents feelings of alienation between dissimilar 
individuals and G
W(F) represents feelings of identification between similar individuals. 
A different interpretation of this identification-alienation framework in terms of 
individual utility functions and the difference between mean income values is proposed 
in section 3 below. 
Now we generalize the Wolfson bipolarization index in terms of the between-groups 
and within-groups Gini components for any z income value. 
Theorem 1 (the Generalized Wolfson polarization index): Let F ∈ ℜ
n be an income 
distribution separated into two groups by any income value z. Then, the Generalized 
Wolfson polarization index (GPz(F) henceforth) in terms of the between-groups and 
within-groups Gini components is: 
[] () z q
z






z z − − + − = µ
µ
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2
) ( ) ( 2 ) ( . (6) 
 
Proof: In what follows, consider a z income value below the median (without loss of 
generality). We obtain the following expression for bipolarization when the Wolfson 
methodology (mutatis mutandis) is applied: 
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z
F GP z z − =
µ
 (7) 
where Tz is the trapezoid area delimited by the 45-degree line and the tangent to the 
Lorenz curve at the z population percentile. This area is equal to the vertical distance 
between the 45-degree line and the tangent value at the median population percentile 
(see Figure 2). 
The vertical distance between the Lorenz curve value at the z population percentile, 
L(qz), and the 45-degree line, is equal to the between-groups Gini coefficient by 
construction (see Figure 2): 
) ( ) ( F G q L q B
B
z z z = − = .   (8) 
Therefore, we must obtain Tz as a function of B to generalize the Wolfson 
bipolarization index in terms of the between-groups and within-groups Gini components 
for any z income value. 
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Consider the trapezoid delimited by the diagonal line, with a slope of unity, the 
tangent to the Lorenz curve at qz, with a slope of z/µ, and the vertical distances B and Tz 





           Figure 3. The B-Tz trapezoid area 
 
Since the slope of the diagonal line is unity, the height of the segment t1 is 0.5-qz. If 
we apply the straight-line equation 
2 it is easy to show that segment a1 is equal to 
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.   (10) 
Hence, expression (6) for the Generalized Wolfson index of polarization is obtained. 
The proof is similar if we consider a z income above the median value and expression 
(6) does not change. The following two corollaries are obtained. 
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Corollary 1: Let F ∈ ℜ
n be an income distribution and GPz(F) be the Generalized 
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Corollary 2: Let F ∈ ℜ
n be an income distribution and GPz(F) be the Generalized 
Wolfson polarization measure. If z = µ, then  [ ] ) ( ) ( 2 ) ( F G F G F GP
W B
µ µ µ − = . 
 
The polarization expressions for the median and the mean income values found in the 
literature (see expressions (4) and (5)) are represented as special cases of the 
Generalized Wolfson polarization measure. 
To complete this section, it is shown that the Generalized Wolfson bipolarization 
measure is a function of the Esteban et al. (1999) polarization index when two income 
groups are considered and the measurement error weight β is equal to unity. When only 
two groups are considered, the Generalized Wolfson bipolarization is a function of the 
Esteban and Ray (1994) polarization measure. These relationships are used later to 
generalize some of the results obtained for the Esteban et al. (1999) and Esteban and 
Ray (1994) polarization measures. 
Theorem 2 (the Generalized Wolfson polarization measure as a function of the Esteban 
et al. (1999) polarization index): Let F ∈ ℜ
n be an income distribution and GPz(F) be 
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where ) ; ; ( β α F P
EGR
z  is the Esteban et al. (1999) polarization index for the income 
distribution F separated into two groups by the z income value, α is the identification 
sensitivity parameter, β is the measurement error weight and T is 
α α ) 1 ( z z q q − + . 
 
Proof: The Esteban et al. (1999) polarization index is: 




z βε α β α − =  (12) 
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where ) ; ( α F P
ER
z  is the Esteban and Ray (1994) polarization index for two income 
groups separated by the z income value and  ) ; ( l F ε  is the measurement error that 
occurs when l (which requires agrupated data) is considered as the relevant income 
distribution instead of F. 
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where qi and µi are the population quintile and the mean income value of income group 
i, respectively. Therefore, when we consider two income groups: 
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Expression (16) with β = 1, together with (6), proves theorem 2. 
 
Corollary 3: Let F ∈ ℜ
n be an income distribution, let GPz(F) be the Generalized 
Wolfson polarization measure and let  ) ; ; ( β α F P
EGR
z  be the Esteban et al. (1999) 
polarization index for two income groups separated by the z income value. When the 
identification sensitivity parameter α and the measurement error weight β are equal to 
unity, it follows that: 
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Corollary 4: Let F ∈ ℜ
n be an income distribution, let GPz(F) be the Generalized 
Wolfson polarization measure and let  ) ; ; ( β α F P
EGR
z  be the Esteban et al. (1999) 
polarization index for two income groups separated by the m income value. When the 
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identification sensitivity parameter α and the measurement error weight β are equal to 
unity, it follows that: 
() 1 ; 1 ;
2






= . (18) 
Corollary 5: Let F ∈ ℜ
n be an income distribution, let GPz(F) be the Generalized 
Wolfson polarization measure and let  ) ; ; ( β α F P
EGR
z  be the Esteban et al. (1999) 
polarization index for two income groups separated by the µ income value. When the 
identification sensitivity parameter α and the measurement error weight β are equal to 
unity, it follows that: 
() 1 ; 1 ; 2 ) ( F P F GP
EGR
µ µ = .   (19) 
Theorem 3 (the Generalized Wolfson polarization measure as a function of the Esteban 
and Ray (1994) polarization index): Let F ∈ ℜ
n be an income distribution, let GPz(F) be 
the Generalized Wolfson polarization measure and let  ) ; ( α F P
ER
z  be the Esteban and 
Ray (1994) polarization index for two income groups separated by the z income value. 
Then, it follows that: 
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where α is the identification sensitivity parameter and T is 
α α ) 1 ( z z q q − + . 
 
Proof: When we consider the following expression in (6), the result above is obtained. 
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Corollary 6: Let F ∈ ℜ
n be an income distribution, let GPz(F) be the Generalized 
Wolfson polarization measure and let  ) ; ( α F P
ER
m  be the Esteban and Ray (1994) 
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Corollary 7: Let F ∈ ℜ
n be an income distribution, let GPz(F) be the Generalized 
Wolfson polarization measure and let  ) ; ( α µ F P
ER  be the Esteban and Ray (1994) 
polarization index for two income groups separated by the µ income value. It follows 
that: 
() ) ( 2 ;
2




µ µ µ α − = .                    (23) 
 
However, note that the Esteban and Ray (1994) and Esteban et al. (1999) 
polarization indexes can be applied to any number of income groups. By contrast, the 
Generalized Wolfson polarization measure can only be applied to two income groups. 
In the next section, we use abbreviated welfare functions containing the Gini 
coefficient to interpret polarization in terms of welfare. 
 
3  Polarization and welfare 
An interesting relationship between polarization and welfare measures arises when envy 
between people is incorporated into their utility functions. We show that polarization 
increases when the welfare of the richer income group increases or the welfare of the 
poorer income group falls. 
It is well known that the rankings induced on any two income distributions with the 
same mean income value by a symmetric, increasing and individualistic abbreviated 
welfare function W, and by –G, are not necessarily the same (Newbery, 1970). 
Nevertheless, the use of an abbreviated welfare function containing the Gini coefficient 
can be justified when W is non-individualistic (see, for example, Sheshinski, 1972, 
Kakwani, 1980 and 1986). 
Let D(x;y) be the relative deprivation felt by an individual with income x in relation 
to an individual with income y, where: 
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x y y x D − = ) ; (  if  x ≤ y    
0 ) ; ( = y x D                  if x ≥ y                                                 (24) 
(see Runciman, 1966). Then, the overall deprivation felt by an individual with income x 
is: 
∫ = dy y f y x D x DF ) ( ) ; ( ) ( .   (25) 
Now let U
D(x, F) be the utility function of an individual with income x, where: 
) ( ) , ( x bD ax F x U F
D − =       a, b > 0.   (26) 
The individual cares not only about his or her own income but also about the 
distribution to which he or she belongs. In particular, the higher the deprivation felt by 
the individual, the lower his or her utility. 
The following result justifies the use of an abbreviated welfare function containing 
the Gini coefficient when W is non-individualistic. 
 
Result 1 (Lambert, 2001, pp. 123-124):
3 when  ) ( ) , ( x bD ax F x U F
D − = , 
∫ − = = ) ( ) ( ) , ( F F
D D
F bG a dx x f F x U W µ  for every income distribution F. 
 
We use this result (for a = b = 1) later to link overall polarization in society to the 
welfare level of the rich income group. 
A parallel result arises when the new concept of relative abundance is introduced. 
Let A(x;y) be the relative abundance felt by an individual with income x in relation to 
an individual with income y, where: 
 
y x y x A − = ) ; ( i f   x ≥ y    
                                                 
3 A similar result,  [] ) 1 ( 5 . 0 F F F G b a W + − = µ , is obtained when the altruistic utility function 
[] ) ( ) , ( x bF a x F x U − =    a, b > 0 is used, in which the arguments are the individual’s own income level 
and the proportion of people who are worse off than that individual. 
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0 ) ; ( = y x A                  if x ≤ y. (27) 
The overall abundance felt by an individual with income x is: 
∫ = dy y f y x A x AF ) ( ) ; ( ) ( . (28) 
Now let U
A(x, F) be the utility function of the individual with income x, where: 
) ( ) , ( x bA ax F x U F
A + =     a, b > 0.   (29) 
In this case, envy is different: an individual with income x is better off when more 
people have less income than he or she has. People care for status. Consequently, the 
more relative abundance felt by an individual with income x, the higher his or her 
utility. 
The following result allows the use of an abbreviated welfare function (containing 
the Gini coefficient) when W is non-individualistic in a different way than in the context 
of result 1. 
Theorem 4 (a welfare function based on the relative abundance concept):
4 let F ∈ ℜ
n 
be an income distribution, let AF(x) be the relative abundance function and let 
) ( ) , ( x bA ax F x U F
A + =  for a, b > 0; then  ∫ + = = ) ( ) ( ) , ( F F
A A
F bG a dx x f F x U W µ . 
 









− + = =
00 0
) ( ) ( ) ( ) , ( dx x f dy y f y x b a dx x f F x U W
x
A A
F µ .   (30) 







 , we have: 
                                                 
4 A similar result,  [] ) 1 ( 5 . 0 F F F G b a W + + = µ , is obtained when the utility function 
[] ) ( ) , ( x bF a x F x U + =  a, b > 0 is used, in which the arguments are the individual’s own income level 
and the proportion of people who are worse off than that individual. 
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dy y f y q L
x
) ( ) (
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) ( ) ( ' dq q L q qL b a W
A
F µ .   (33) 
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dq q qL .   (35) 
Substituting expressions (34) and (35) into equation (33) completes the proof. 
 
We use this theorem (for a = b = 1) later to link overall polarization in society to the 
welfare level of the poor income group. However, we must prove the following lemma 
before linking abbreviated welfare functions and economic polarization. 
In the following lemma, we decompose the Generalized Wolfson polarization 
measure into two terms, which correspond to the two transformed areas (below and 
above L(qz)) that define polarization (see Figure 1). 
Lemma 1 (the Generalized Wolfson polarization measure decomposition): Let F ∈ ℜ
n 
be an income distribution and let GPz(F) be the Generalized Wolfson polarization 
measure. Then, it follows that: 
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where each term on the right-hand side of equation (36) corresponds to the two 
transformed areas (below and above L(qz)) that define polarization (represented by the 
shaded areas in Figure 1). 
 
Proof: Theorem 1 implies that: 
[] () = − − + − = z q
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µ
. (38) 
Reordering terms in (38) yields expression (36). 
Note that the two terms on the right-hand side of equation (36) are the two areas 
below and above L(qz), which define polarization. The following term corresponds to 
the trapezoid area below qz: 
() [] z z z z z z z z q q
z
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) (  is the negative vertex of the trapezoid and is obtained by 
applying the point-slope form of the straight-line equation (see footnote 2). 
The following term corresponds to the trapezoid area above qz: 
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 is also obtained by applying the point-slope form of 
the straight-line equation (see footnote 2). 
Having proved Lemma 1, consideration of the welfare functions discussed above 
(see result 1 and theorem 4) leads to the following result. 
Theorem 5 (the Generalized Wolfson polarization measure as a function of the welfare 
levels of the income groups): Let F ∈ ℜ
n be an income distribution, let GPz(F) be the 
Generalized Wolfson polarization measure, let WP
A be the welfare level of the poor 
income group and let WR



























z z .   (41) 
Polarization increases when the welfare of the rich income group rises or the welfare of 
the poor income group falls, and vice versa. 
 
Proof: Let µP be the mean income value of the poor income group (the one below the z 
income value) and let µR be the mean income value of the rich income group (above the 












      ∀ q ∈ [0, qz]       (42) 
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     ∀ q ∈ (qz, 1].   (43) 
We derive from (3): 
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Therefore, given expressions (42), (43), (44) and (45), we have: 
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Substituting expressions (46) and (47) into equation (36), given that 
µ
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We need only consider result 1 and theorem 2 for a = b = 1 to obtain expression (41) in 
Theorem 5. 
 
Polarization is viewed as a function of individuals’ welfare levels that depends not 
only on individuals’ own incomes but also on their feelings of envy of others in their 
own income groups. In particular, people in the rich income group feel envy (relative 
deprivation) of individuals with higher incomes, whereas people in the poor income 
group feel envy (relative abundance) of individuals with lower incomes. 
On the one hand, income polarization increases when the mean income value of the 
rich income group increases (that is, when µR moves away from z), whereas polarization 
decreases when the mean income value of the poor income group increases (that is, 
when µP moves closer to z). On the other hand, income polarization increases when 
relative deprivation in the rich income group or relative abundance in the poor income 
group decreases. This polarization result has the following clear interpretation in the 
context of the identification–alienation framework. 
(a) When µR moves away from z, alienation (between the income groups) increases; 
when µP moves closer to z, alienation decreases. 
(b) When relative deprivation in the rich income group decreases, identification 
(within the rich income group) increases. When relative abundance in the poor income 
group decreases, identification (within the poor income group) increases. 
Alienation is determined by the difference between µR and µP. Identification depends 
negatively on the levels of envy, relative deprivation and relative abundance felt by 
individuals. 
A relevant question arises. The polarization models of Esteban and Ray (1994) and 
Duclos et al. (2004) treated the identification term as the value of the density function. 
However, there is no reason to believe that the grouping of income distribution data 
conveniently conforms to the psychological demands of group identification, as the 
authors acknowledged. In this respect, our framework for analysis seems closer to their 
original motivation for the identification–alienation framework. In fact, feelings of 
identification are based on individuals’ utility functions, in which not only are 
individuals’ own incomes important, but also their feelings of envy matter. 
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Note that the welfare of the rich income group is generally, but not necessarily, 
higher than the welfare of the poor income group. It is possible that the level of relative 
abundance or feelings of deprivation experienced by people in the poor and rich income 
groups, respectively, more than offset the difference between the mean values of the 
rich and poor income groups. 
A straightforward result derived from theorem 5 is stated in the following corollary. 
Corollary 8: Let F ∈ ℜ
n be an income distribution and let GPz(F) be the Generalized 





R m W W
m
F GP − =
2
1
) ( .   (49) 
 
Polarization is half the difference between the normalized (by the median income) 
welfare levels of the rich and poor income groups when income groups are separated by 
the median income value. 
In this case, the welfare of the rich income group is unambiguously higher than the 
welfare level of the poor income group because polarization cannot be negative. Hence, 
polarization decreases when the welfare level of the poor income group approaches that 
of the rich income group. 
The following theorem generalizes the relationship between polarization and welfare 
to the Esteban et al. (1999) polarization index. 
Theorem 6 (the Esteban et al. (1999) polarization index as a function of the welfare 
levels of the income groups): Let F ∈ ℜ
n be an income distribution, let  ) ; ; ( β α F P
EGR
z  be 
the Esteban et al. (1999) polarization measure for two income groups separated by the z 
income value, let WP
A be the welfare level of the poor income group and let WR
D be the 
welfare level of the rich income group. Then, it follows that: 
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1 ) 1 ( 1 1 ; 1 ;
2 2 .   (50) 
According to the Esteban et al. (1999) polarization index, polarization is a function of 
individuals’ welfare levels when the identification sensitivity parameter α and the 
parameter β are equal to unity and there are only two income groups. 
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Proof: Given expressions (17) and (41), the proof of this result is straightforward. 
 
Corollary 9: Let F ∈ ℜ
n be an income distribution, let  ) ; ; ( β α F P
EGR
z  be the Esteban et 
al. (1999) polarization measure for two income groups separated by the m income 
value, let WP
A be the welfare level of the poor income group and let WR
D be the welfare 
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1 ; 1 ; .   (51) 
Corollary 10: Let F ∈ ℜ
n be an income distribution, let  ) ; ; ( β α F P
EGR
z  be the Esteban et 
al. (1999) polarization measure for two income groups separated by the µ income value, 
let WP
A be the welfare level of the poor income group and let WR
D be the welfare level of 























q F P .   (52) 
 
4  Polarization and poverty 
Polarization and poverty measures can be related when the z income value that separates 
the income groups represents the poverty line. In this case, polarization between poor 
people and those elsewhere in the income distribution explicitly considers the value of a 
poverty index. In the next three results, the Generalized Wolfson polarization measure is 
expressed as a function of the Sen poverty index (Sen, 1976), its extension due to 
Shorrocks (1995) and as a function of one of the Foster–Greer–Thorbecke family of 
poverty measures, the normalized poverty deficit (see Foster et al., 1984). It is shown 
that more poverty, due to an increase in the income gap ratio, implies greater income 
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polarization in society. Furthermore, more wealth, due to an increase in the income 
overabundance gap ratio, also implies greater polarization. 
First, recall some concepts. The Sen poverty index is: 
[] P z z z
S
z G F I F I F H F S )) ( 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( − + =  (53) 
where z is the poverty line, Hz(F) = qz is the headcount ratio or the proportion of the 






− =1 ) (  is the income gap ratio (Sen, 1976).
 5 
Shorrocks (1995) proposed the following generalization of the Sen poverty index: 
P z z z z z
SH
z G F I F H F I F H F H F S )) ( 1 )( ( ) ( ) ( )) ( 2 ( ) ( − + − = . (54) 
This poverty index is not only replication invariant but also continuous and consistent 
with the progressive transfer axiom. 




z dx x f x F S
0
) ( ) ( ) ; (








= Γ 0 , max ) (
z
x z
x  and  0 ≥ γ . Note that since  ∫ − =
z
z dx x f x z F D
0
) ( ) ( ) (  is the 
poverty deficit index, the Foster–Greer–Thorbecke family of poverty measures is the 
normalized poverty deficit index or the product of the headcount and income gap ratios, 
) ( ) ( / ) ( F I F H z F D z z z = , when  1 = γ . 
 
Analogously to the normalized poverty deficit index, the normalized wealth surplus 




 − − = = 1 1 ) ( ) ( ) (
w
q F O F H F R
R
w w w w
µ
                 ( 5 6 )  
where w is the wealth line, that is, the income value above which anyone is considered 
rich. This index is the product of the proportion of the population who are rich in F, 
                                                 




G F z I r r F z I F z H F S )) ( 1 ( 1 / ) ( ) ( ) ( − + + = , where r is the number of poor persons. 
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) q - (1   ) ( w = F H w , and the income overabundance gap ratio, ) (F Ow , which is the 
average wealth gap, µR-w, normalized by the wealth threshold.
6    
The wealth line w and the poverty line z are the same in a bipolarized society where 
there are only rich and poor people.  
 
Theorem 7 (the Generalized Wolfson polarization measure as a function of the Sen 
poverty index): Let F ∈ ℜ
n be an income distribution, let GPz(F) be the Generalized 
Wolfson polarization measure and let 
S
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where  P G  is the Gini coefficient for the poor income group,  ) (F Rz  is the normalized 
wealth surplus index and  ) (F G
W
z  is the within-groups Gini coefficient. 
 
Proof: Consider equation (48) and expression (53) together: 
() [] () ()  
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w x dF w x F M ) ( ) ( ) ( and therefore Rw(F)=Mw(F)/w. 
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Corollary 11 (the Generalized Wolfson polarization measure as a function of the 
Shorrocks poverty index): Let F ∈ ℜ
n be an income distribution, let GPz(F) be the 
Generalized Wolfson polarization measure and let 
SH
z S (F) be the Shorrocks poverty 




































where  ) (F Rz  is the normalized wealth surplus index. This corollary is straightforward 
given the proof of theorem 7 and expression (54) (mutatis mutandis). 
 
Corollary 12  (the Generalized Wolfson polarization measure as a function of the 
normalized poverty deficit index):
7 Let F ∈ ℜ
n be an income distribution, let GPz(F) be 
the Generalized Wolfson polarization measure and let  ) ; ( γ F S
FGT
z  be the Foster–Greer–
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z






   (62) 
where ) 1 ; (F S
FGT
z  is the normalized poverty deficit index and  ) (F Rz  is the normalized 
wealth surplus index. 
 
Bipolarization between poor people and those elsewhere in the income distribution 
explicitly considers the value of a poverty index: the Sen poverty index, its extension 
due to Shorrocks (1995) or the normalized poverty deficit index. Moreover, polarization 
is a function of wealth according to the normalized wealth surplus index. However, the 
proposed polarization measure is not an increasing function of these four measures.  
On one hand, polarization depends negatively on the dispersion within the income 
groups according to the Gini coefficient. As shown in section 2, progressive transfers 
within groups increase polarization. As a result, when the Gini coefficient for the poor 
income group changes, polarization and poverty (measured by the Sen poverty index or 
                                                 
7 It can be shown that the area below the first polarization curve (see Wolfson 1994, 1997) for incomes 
below z is equal to the normalized poverty deficit index. 
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the Shorrocks poverty index) vary in opposite directions.
8 On the other hand, the effect 
of a change in the proportion of poor or rich people on polarization is ambiguous.
9 
When the proportion of poor or rich people changes, polarization, poverty and wealth 
can vary in the same direction but also in the opposite one. As a result, a greater 
proportion of poor people in society does not imply necessarily more social conflict 
measured by a polarization index. 
Only changes in the income gap ratio guarantee that polarization and poverty vary in 
the same direction (more poverty implies more polarization); only  changes in the 
income overabundance gap ratio guarantee that polarization and wealth vary in the same 
direction (more wealth implies more polarization).  
 
In what follows, we generalize the relationship between poverty and polarization to 
the Esteban and Ray (1994) and Esteban et al. (1999) polarization indexes. 
Theorem 8 (the Esteban and Ray (1994) polarization measure as a function of the Sen 
poverty index): Let F ∈ ℜ
n be an income distribution, let  ) ; ( α F P
ER
z  be the Esteban and 
Ray (1994) polarization index for two income groups separated by the z income value 
and let 
S
z S (F) be the Sen poverty measure. Then, it follows that: 
() ) )( 2 1 ( ) ( 1 ) ( ) ; ( z q
T
F R q G
z
q F S q
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α    (63) 
where  ) (F Rz  is the normalized wealth surplus index. Note that the negative second 
term on the right-hand side of equation (63) is zero when z is equal to m or µ. 
 
Proof: Given expressions (20) and (57) and the proof of theorem 8, this proof is 
straightforward. 
 
                                                 





µ 2 2 ) ( − = . 
9 This can be checked by deriving GPz(F) with respect to qz. 
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Corollary 13 (the Esteban and Ray (1994) polarization measure as a function of the 
Shorrocks poverty index): Let F ∈ ℜ
n be an income distribution, let  ) ; ( α F P
ER
z  be the 
Esteban and Ray (1994) polarization index for two income groups separated by the z 
income value and let 
SH
z S (F) be the Shorrocks poverty measure. Then, it follows that: 




































where  ) (F Rz  is the normalized wealth surplus index. Note that the negative second 
term on the right-hand side of equation (64) is zero when z is equal to m or µ. 
 
Corollary 14  (the Esteban and Ray (1994) polarization index as a function of the 
normalized poverty deficit index): Let F ∈ ℜ
n be an income distribution, let  ) ; ( α F P
ER
z  
be the Esteban and Ray (1994) polarization index for two income groups separated by 
the  z income value and let  ) ; ( γ F S
FGT
z  be the Foster–Greer–Thorbecke family of 
poverty measures. Then, it follows that: 
() [] ) )( 2 1 ( ) ( 1 ) 1 ; ( ) ; ( z q
T
F R q F S q
zT




z − − − − + = µ
µ µ
α    (65) 
where  ) (F Rz  is the normalized wealth surplus index. 
 
Corollary 15  (the Esteban and Ray (1994) polarization index as a function of the 
normalized poverty deficit index): Let F ∈ ℜ
n be an income distribution, let  ) ; ( α F P
ER
m  
be the Esteban and Ray (1994) polarization index for two income groups separated by 
the  m income value and let  ) ; ( γ F S
FGT
z  be the Foster–Greer–Thorbecke family of 
poverty measures. Then, it follows that: 
[] ) ( ) 1 ; (
2








α    (66) 
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where  ) (F Rz  is the normalized richness surplus index. 
 
Corollary 16  (the Esteban and Ray (1994) polarization index as a function of the 
normalized poverty deficit index): Let F ∈ ℜ
n be an income distribution, let  ) ; ( α µ F P
ER  
be the Esteban and Ray (1994) polarization index for two income groups separated by 
the µ income value and let  ) ; ( γ F S
FGT
z  be the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke family of poverty 
measures. Then, it follows that: 
[ ] ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ; ( ) ; ( F R q F S q T F P
FGT ER
µ µ µ µ µ α − + = .   (67) 
 
In the last two results, polarization between poor people and those elsewhere in the 
income distribution is simply a function of poverty, according to the normalized poverty 
deficit index, and wealth, according to the normalized wealth surplus index. 
Theorem 9 (the Esteban et al. (1999) polarization measure as a function of the Sen 
poverty index): Let F ∈ ℜ
n be an income distribution, let  ) ; ; ( β α F P
EGR
z  be the Esteban 
et al. (1999) polarization index for two income groups separated by the z income value 
and let 
S
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  (68) 
where  ) (F Rz  is the normalized wealth surplus index. 
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Corollary 17 (the Esteban et al. (1999) polarization measure as a function of the 
Shorrocks poverty index): Let F ∈ ℜ
n be an income distribution, let  ) ; ; ( β α F P
EGR
z  be 
the Esteban et al. (1999) polarization index for two income groups separated by the z 
income value and let 
SH
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2
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   (69) 
where  ) (F Rz  is the normalized wealth surplus index. 
 
Corollary 18  (the Esteban et al. (1999) polarization index as a function of the 
normalized poverty deficit  index): Let F  ∈  ℜ
n be an income distribution, let 
) ; ; ( β α F P
EGR
z  be the Esteban et al. (1999) polarization index for two income groups 
separated by the z income value and let  ) ; ( γ F S
FGT
z  be the Foster–Greer–Thorbecke 
family of poverty measures. Then 
() [ ] ) (
1












z − − − − − + = µ
µ µ
α    (70) 
where  ) (F Rz  is the normalized wealth surplus index. 
 
The Esteban and Ray (1994) and Esteban et al. (1999) polarization indexes explicitly 
consider the value of a poverty index (the Sen poverty index, its extension due to 
Shorrocks (1995) and the normalized poverty deficit index) and the value of a wealth 
index (the normalized wealth surplus index). However, it is guaranteed that polarization, 
poverty and wealth vary in the same direction if only the income gap ratio and/or the 
income overabundance gap ratio change. Again, a greater proportion of poor people 
does not imply necessarily more social conflict measured by a polarization index. 
 
All the proposed results in this section are related to the measurement of 
bipolarization. That is, the results only apply to income distributions that are divided 
into two groups. It may be necessary to generalize to more than two income groups, for 
centrA:
Fundación Centro de Estudios Andaluces
A:  27
example, to analyze a society in which there are poor people, middle-income people and 
rich people. In this case the following two results arise. 
 
Theorem 10 (the Esteban and Ray (1994) polarization measure as a function of the 
normalized poverty deficit index when there are three income groups): Let F ∈ ℜ
n be an 
income distribution, let  ) ; ( , α F P
ER
w z  be the Esteban and Ray (1994) polarization index for 
three income groups separated by the z and w income values and let  ) ; ( γ F S
FGT
z  be the 
Foster-Greer-Thorbecke family of poverty measures. Then, it follows that: 




w z q F R Cw B q F S Az F P − + + + − = µ α    (71) 
where ) (F Rw  is the normalized wealth surplus index and  
 A =
α α α + + − + − + −
1 1 ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( w z w z z q q q q q  
 B = () ( )
α α α + + − − − + − + −
1 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( w z w z w z z w q q q q q q q q  and  
C = 
α α α + + + − + −
1 1 ) 1 ( ) ( z w w z w q q q q q .  
 
Proof: Given expression (13) for three income groups separated by the poverty line z 
and the wealth line w the result is obtained after a few transformations. 
 
Corollary 19  (the Esteban et al. (1999) polarization index as a function of the 
normalized poverty deficit index when there are three income groups): Let F ∈ ℜ
n be an 
income distribution, let  ) ; ; ( , β α F P
EGR
w z  be the Esteban et al. (1999) polarization index for 
three income groups separated by the z and w income values and let  ) ; ( γ F S
FGT
z  be the 
Foster–Greer–Thorbecke family of poverty measures. Then 
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In a similar way, mutatis mutandis, the relationship between polarization (measured 
by the Esteban and Ray (1994) and Esteban et al. (1999) polarization indexes), poverty 
(measured by the normalized poverty deficit index) and wealth (measured by the 
normalized wealth surplus index) can be obtained when the income range is divided in 
four or more income groups. Again, the Esteban and Ray (1994) and Esteban et al. 
(1999) polarization indexes explicitly consider the value of the normalized poverty 
deficit index and the value of the normalized wealth surplus index. As a result, more 
poverty and wealth in terms of the income gap ratio and/or the income overabundance 




5  Concluding remarks 
Several links between polarization measures and inequality, welfare and poverty 
measures have been established in this paper. The Wolfson polarization measure is 
generalized in terms of the between-groups and within-groups Gini components for 
income groups separated by any z income value. In addition, links between the 
Generalized Wolfson polarization measure and the Esteban and Ray (1994) and Esteban 
et al. (1999) polarization indexes have been proposed. It has also been shown that 
polarization, according to the Generalized Wolfson polarization index and the Esteban 
et al. (1999) polarization measure, is the difference between the welfare levels of rich 
and poor income groups when individuals’ feelings of identification with others are 
based on their utility functions. Furthermore, the proposed polarization measure, the 
Esteban and Ray (1994) and the Esteban et al. (1999) polarization measures are a 
function of the Sen poverty index, its extension due to Shorrocks (1995) and the 
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